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ABSTRACT 
 
Sell-in versus Sell-through Revenue Recognition:  An Examination of  
Firm Characteristics and Financial Information Quality. (August 2009) 
Stephanie Jean Binger Rasmussen, B.S., Minnesota State University Moorhead;  
M.B.A., The University of Tennessee at Knoxville 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Anwer S. Ahmed 
 
 This study examines revenue recognition methods used by high technology firms 
for sales to distributors.  Revenue is either recognized when products are delivered to 
distributors (sell-in) or when distributors resell products to end-users (sell-through).  
This is the first empirical study to examine the firms that use these revenue recognition 
methods and the quality of financial information reported under the methods. 
I use a logistic regression to compare 479 firm-year observations in the computer 
and electronic equipment industries that use either the sell-in method or the sell-through 
method.  I find that firms with higher growth opportunities and strong corporate 
governance are less likely to use the sell-in method.  In addition, corporate governance 
strength moderates the association between use of the sell-in method and both capital 
requirements and management incentive compensation.  
Using ordinary least squares regression, I also examine two proxies for financial 
information quality:  the ability of accounting information to predict future cash flows 
and the association between accounting information and stock returns.  Results of these 
 iv 
regressions suggest that financial information quality is higher under a deferred revenue 
recognition method (sell-through).  Specifically, the ability of accounting information to 
predict future cash flows and the association between accounting information and returns 
are both higher for sell-through firms than for sell-in firms. 
The results of this study suggest that systematic differences exist between sell-in 
firms and sell-through firms and financial information quality differs between the two 
revenue recognition methods. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 This study examines revenue recognition methods used by high technology firms 
for sales to distributors.  Distributors purchase products from manufacturers and resell 
the products to end-users.  This activity is common within high technology industries, 
and current accounting standards allow firms some discretion on when to recognize 
revenue from sales to distributors.  Two revenue recognition methods exist:  the sell-in 
method and the sell-through method.  I address two research questions in this study.  
First, what firm characteristics are associated with technology firms‘ choice of revenue 
recognition method for sales to distributors?  Second, does the quality of financial 
information differ between the two revenue recognition methods? 
Under the sell-in method, firms recognize revenue when the product is delivered 
to the distributor (i.e. product is sold into the distribution channel).  Under the sell-
through method, firms defer revenue recognition until the distributor resells the product 
to an end customer (i.e. product is sold through the distribution channel).  Sales to 
distributors usually meet the Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 104 revenue 
recognition requirements that persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists and delivery 
has occurred.1   The decision to use the sell-in or sell-through method generally depends 
upon the remaining two SAB 104 requirements:  the final selling price is fixed or 
determinable and collectability is reasonably assured.  Sales in high technology 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
1 The revenue recognition principles contained in SAB 104 are relatively unchanged from SAB 101 (SEC 
1999, 2003).  The main purpose of SAB 104 was to rescind accounting guidance within SAB 101 that was 
superseded by the FASB‘s Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 00-21.   
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industries are often subject to rights of return and to pricing adjustments due to price 
reductions in the marketplace.  A conservative interpretation of SAB 104 suggests that 
the final selling price for any distributor sales subject to pricing adjustments or rights of 
return are indeterminable.  However, interpretive guidance within SAB 104 suggests that 
a selling price is determinable if product returns and pricing adjustments can be 
reasonably estimated.2  The probability of collection depends on the fixed or 
determinable nature of the final selling price and if collections depend on the distributor 
reselling the products.  Based on these factors, the sell-in method is typically considered 
the more aggressive method (Glass, Lewis & Co. 2004; Greenberg 2006).  However, the 
discretion provided under SAB 104 allows high technology firms enough flexibility to 
justify using either revenue recognition method.3   
Understanding the characteristics of firms that use different revenue recognition 
methods and financial information quality under those methods is important for many 
reasons.  First, revenue is arguably the most important component of earnings.  Revenue 
is usually the largest item on the income statement and it is often viewed as a strong 
indicator of firm performance (Turner 2001).  A former chairman of the SEC argued that 
early or premature revenue recognition is a fundamental problem in accounting (Levitt 
1998), and misreported revenue is a leading cause of financial restatements (GAO 
                                                 
2 Guidance about fixed and determinable sales prices refers to Statement 48, para. 6 and 8, which state that 
revenue cannot be recognized if a firm is unable to make a reasonable estimate of product returns (FASB 
1981).  SAB 104 also directs users to SOP 97-2, para. 26 and 30-33, which states that prices on products 
sold to distributors are not fixed and determinable if the seller is unable to make reasonable estimates of 
pricing adjustments (AICPA 1997).   
3 The first two disclosure examples in Appendix A suggest that sales arrangements with distributors are 
essentially identical for the firms identified, yet one firm uses the sell-in method and the other uses the 
sell-through method. 
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2007).4  Overstated revenue has also been documented as the cause of at least 50 percent 
of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) (Feroz et al. 1991; Dechow 
et al. 1996; Dechow et al. 2007).   
Second, evidence on the effects of sell-in and sell-through methods on firm 
reporting quality is potentially useful to standard setters.  The FASB has undertaken a 
joint project with the IASB to create a comprehensive revenue recognition standard 
(FASAC 2006).  While it is unclear if the comprehensive revenue recognition standard 
will allow both the sell-in and sell-through methods, Lynn Turner, former SEC Chief 
Accountant, has expressed concerns about the sell-in method (Greenberg 2006): 
I have had to deal with the issue of whether you recognize revenue upon sell-in 
versus sell-through as an audit partner, a CFO and as a regulator, and now as an 
advisor to institutions.  In all of these, I found nothing good about revenue 
recognition upon sell-in.  Sooner or later, the urge to stuff the channel, especially 
when things are not going well and numbers for the next quarter are short, is very 
tempting.   
 
The FASB‘s current Statement of Concepts (FASB 1978, para. 37) and a recent 
exposure draft of the proposed future conceptual framework (FASB 2008) both argue 
that financial reporting should provide information that capital providers and other 
parties can use to assess an entity‘s future net cash flows.  Although current period cash 
flows may be the same under both the sell-in and sell-through methods if distributors 
settle accounts receivable prior to product resale, the ability of accounting information to 
predict future cash flows may differ between the two methods.  It is also unclear whether 
                                                 
4 Cost/expense errors and revenue errors were the leading causes of restatements from January 1997-
September 2005.  In this period, 27.4 (27.2) percent of restatements were due to cost/expense (revenue) 
errors (GAO 2007). 
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sell-in or sell-through accounting information is most consistent with firm values.5  To 
my knowledge, this is the first study to empirically examine financial information 
quality under the sell-in and sell-through methods.   
Finally, the evidence presented in this study may be useful for firms in industries 
that use the sell-in and sell-through methods for revenue recognition.  Insights about the 
characteristics of firms that use different revenue recognition methods and the quality of 
financial information under the two methods may be helpful to firms that are examining 
their own revenue recognition practices and/or considering an accounting method 
change.   
In order to address my research questions, I study 479 unique firm-year 
observations in the computers and electronic equipment industries during 2001-2005.  I 
classify firms in these industries as sell-in or sell-through based on their 10-K revenue 
recognition disclosures. 
I first investigate the characteristics of firms that use the sell-in and sell-through 
methods.  Specifically, I test for associations between use of the sell-in method and 
proxies for capital requirements, management incentive compensation, growth 
opportunities, and corporate governance strength.  I find that use of the sell-in method is 
negatively associated with growth opportunities and corporate governance strength.  I 
also find that as capital requirements and management incentive compensation increases, 
                                                 
5 Prior research does examine the association between stock returns and accounting information under 
other revenue recognition practices (e.g. Altamuro et al. 2005; Zhang 2005; Srivastava 2008).  These 
studies all examine firms that were required by standard changes to use less aggressive revenue 
recognition practices.  The evidence presented in these studies suggests that the association between 
accounting information and stock returns was stronger when firms were allowed to accelerate revenue 
recognition than when they were required to delay it. 
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firms with strong corporate governance are less likely to use the sell-in method than 
firms with weak governance.  Thus, corporate governance strength moderates the 
association between use of the sell-in method and other factors. 
Next, I examine whether financial information quality differs between the sell-in 
method and the sell-through method.  It is not clear that one method is consistently more 
reliable than the other method.  The sell-in method may suffer from errors in estimating 
product return and/or pricing adjustment accruals.  Managers may also use the discretion 
allowed under this method to enhance performance through channel stuffing or accrual 
manipulation6.  Meanwhile, reliability concerns exist for sell-through accounting if 
distributor inventory and resale data contain errors or are not updated on a timely basis.  
It is also unclear if financial statement users perceive differences in relevance between 
the two revenue recognition methods.  The sell-in method provides timely information 
about expected future demand but not current end-user demand.  On the other hand, the 
sell-through method more accurately reflects end-user demand and is a signal of 
conservative accounting practices. 
I use two proxies to test for financial information quality differences between the 
sell-in and sell-through methods:  (1) the ability of accrual accounting information to 
predict future cash flows, and (2) the association between accounting information and 
contemporaneous stock returns.  I find that sell-through firms‘ accrual accounting 
information is more highly associated with future cash flows than sell-in firms‘ 
                                                 
6 Channel stuffing occurs when (1) manufacturers pull in and ship distributor orders originally scheduled 
to be delivered in the next accounting period or (2) distributor inventory levels significantly exceed the 
amount historically needed to service end customers. 
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information.  These results are consistent with Forester (2008) who finds that the ability 
of accrual accounting information to predict future cash flows is better for firms using 
deferred revenue recognition practices.  I also find that accounting information reported 
under the sell-through method is more strongly associated with contemporaneous stock 
returns than accounting information reported under the sell-in method.  This suggests 
that the sell-through method provides more timely accounting information than the sell-
in method.  Taken together, the results of these two tests suggest that the sell-through 
method produces higher quality financial information than the sell-in method.  
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, this study 
examines revenue recognition practices that have not previously been examined:  the 
sell-in method, which offers companies the opportunity to accelerate revenue 
recognition, and the sell-through method, under which revenues are likely to be 
recognized relatively conservatively.  Second, this study provides additional evidence 
that use of conservative revenue recognition methods is associated with higher growth 
opportunities and strong corporate governance (Skinner 1993; Altamuro et al. 2005).  In 
addition, corporate governance strength moderates the association between revenue 
recognition practices and certain firm characteristics.  Finally, this study suggests that 
financial information quality is higher under a deferred revenue recognition practice.  
This result is important because prior research offers mixed evidence regarding financial 
information quality under aggressive and delayed revenue recognition methods 
(Altamuro et al. 2005; Zhang 2005; Forester 2008).  The evidence presented in this study 
should be of interest to investors, practitioners, auditors, and regulators. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Chapter II discusses 
background and prior research while Chapter III develops my hypotheses.  Chapter IV 
examines the association between firm characteristics and revenue recognition practices.  
Chapter V examines financial information quality under the sell-in and sell-through 
methods.  Chapter VI concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
 Revenue Recognition Practices of High Technology Industries 
 The sell-in and sell-through methods differ with respect to the timing of revenue 
recognition for sales to distributors.  Under the sell-in method, revenue and cost of goods 
sold are recognized upon product delivery to the distributor.  Under the sell-through 
method, revenue is deferred until notification is received that the distributor has resold 
the product.  Accounts receivable are typically recorded when the distributor receives the 
products, and the distributor often pays for the products before they are resold.  
Distributors typically have some limited right of return, but 10-K filings suggests that 
most distributors do not have unlimited return privileges on regular purchases.7  I expect 
firms‘ revenue recognition method to be relatively sticky over time since a cumulative 
effects adjustment would be needed if firms change accounting methods.  
If distributor purchases equal distributor resales, sell-in revenue differs from sell-
through revenue by the amount of return and pricing adjustment allowances required 
under the sell-in method.  However, if distributor purchases exceed resales, then revenue 
is higher under the sell-in method than the sell-through method.  For example, Apogee 
Technology initially reported fiscal 2003 sell-in product revenue of $9.3 million and 
later retroactively reported 2003 sell-through product revenue of $7.8 million when it 
                                                 
7 Distribution agreements between manufacturers and distributors typically do include clauses that allow 
the distributors to return any product on hand if the relationship between the two parties is terminated (e.g. 
Arrow Electronics 2004 10-K filing; Avnet 2005 10-K filing; Ingram Micro 2005 10-K filing).  However, 
most manufacturers and distributors enter into agreements with the intent of maintaining a long-term 
relationship. 
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changed accounting methods (Apogee Technology 2004 10-K/A filing).8  The difference 
is because distributor purchases were significantly higher than resales.  This example 
indicates that revenue recognition practices can significantly affect reported operating 
performance.     
Current U.S. GAAP provides some revenue recognition guidance for product 
sales to distributors.  As discussed earlier, revenue recognition under SAB 104 requires 
(1) persuasive evidence that an arrangement exists, (2) delivery has occurred, (3) final 
selling price is fixed or determinable, and (4) collectability is reasonably assured.  SAB 
104 also notes that product returns estimations, and thus determination of a final selling 
price, for sales to distributors may be difficult due to the following factors:  channel 
stuffing, difficulty in observing distributor inventory and resale data, and the 
significance of a distributor to the seller‘s business. 9  Estimates of future pricing 
adjustments may also be difficult, and SAB 104 refers financial statement preparers to 
SOP 97-2 for guidance on this issue.10   
 The distributor is considered the customer for revenue recognition purposes but 
is not the end-user of the products.  Distributors attempt to stock products they can 
resell, and they purchase inventory based on existing customer orders and expectations 
                                                 
8 Apogee adopted the sell-through method after an investigation by its audit committee found that the 
firm‘s use of the sell-in revenue recognition method did not comply with U.S. GAAP. 
9 It is important to note that it would also be difficult for a firm to use the sell-through revenue recognition 
method if distributor resale and inventory data are not easily obtainable. 
10 High technology firms offer pricing adjustments to their distributors in order to compensate for price 
reductions in the marketplace or to incentivize sales of certain products (Lee et al. 2000; CSFB 2004).  
Since the exact amount of pricing adjustments is often not known until the distributor resells the product, 
firms use historical resale information to estimate pricing adjustment.   
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about future orders. 11  If actual distributor resales significantly vary from forecasted 
orders and speculative beliefs, sell-in revenue will not provide timely information about 
future end-user demand.  
Accounting for revenue from sales to distributors is important for high 
technology firms because these firms depend heavily on distributors to service 
customers.  An equity research report suggest that distributors service more than 25 
percent of global semiconductor/electronic component sales (CSFB 2004), and 
manufacturer 10-K filings suggest that 50 percent or more of their sales can go through 
distributors (e.g. Fairchild Semiconductor 2004 10-K filing; Cypress Semiconductor 
2005 10-K filing).  Distributors provide (1) access to an additional ―sales force,‖ (2) 
aggregation and service of small orders, and (3) reduced collection risk (CSFB 2004). 
Financial Information Quality 
The quality of financial accounting information should be of interest to all parties 
that create or use financial statements.  Earnings quality is often used as an indicator of 
overall financial information quality in prior studies (Schipper and Vincent 2003; 
Francis et al. 2006).  The FASB‘s Conceptual Framework implies that decision 
usefulness is the appropriate benchmark to assess the effectiveness and quality of 
accounting information (Concepts Statement No. 2, FASB (1980), paras. 30 and 32).  
However, financial statement users often define decision usefulness differently.   
                                                 
11 One equity research report suggests that the composition of electronic component distributors‘ inventory 
is as follows:  25 percent to support existing customer orders, 50 percent to support expected future 
customer orders, and 25 percent as speculative inventory to support unanticipated demand (CSFB 2004).   
 11 
Prior studies use accounting-based and market-based measures of earnings 
quality (see Francis et al. 2006 for a thorough discussion).12  Accounting-based measures 
assume that higher quality earnings allow for better estimation of future cash flows, 
earnings, or earnings components.  In general, more persistent, more predictive, and less 
variable earnings are assumed to be of higher quality (e.g. FASB 1980; Penman and 
Zhang 2002; Zhang 2005).  Earnings are also assumed to be higher quality when accrual 
estimation errors are smaller (e.g. Dechow and Dichev 2002).   
Market-based measures assume that higher quality accounting information better 
represents firm value and reflects the good and bad news in stock returns in a timely 
manner.  Studies using returns-earnings regressions view stronger associations as 
evidence of more relevant and reliable accounting information, and thus higher earnings 
quality (e.g. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 2001).  Other studies measure the timeliness 
and conservatism in earnings using earnings-returns regressions and view more timely 
and more conservative earnings as being of higher quality (e.g. Basu 1997; Ball et al. 
2000). 
Prior Research on Revenue Recognition 
There is limited research on firms‘ revenue recognition methods and their impact 
on financial information quality.  Prior research suggests that firms with external 
financing needs, financial covenants, or weaker corporate governance are more likely to 
accelerate revenue recognition (Bowen et al. 2002; Marquardt and Weidman 2004; 
                                                 
12 Additional ex-post indicators of earnings quality include financial restatements, bankruptcies, litigation, 
and discontinuities around earnings targets (Degeorge et al. 1999; Anderson and Yohn 2002; Ecker et al. 
2006). 
 12 
Altamuro et al. 2005).13  Other studies examine firms that adopted accounting standards 
intended to delay revenue recognition (Altamuro et al. 2005; Zhang 2005; Forester 2008; 
Srivastava 2008).  In general, these studies examine short time periods after standard 
changes and find that accelerated revenue recognition results in more timely and relevant 
accounting information.14  However, Forester (2008) examines a longer period and finds 
that the initial decline in earnings informativeness is due to a temporary disturbance 
caused by deferred revenues resulting from SAB 101 adoption.  After these deferred 
revenues are recognized, Forester (2008) finds that the deferred revenue recognition 
method improves earnings informativeness in later periods.   
                                                 
13 Prior research also finds that more than 50 percent of AAERs are due to overstated revenue (Feroz et al. 
1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Dechow et al. 2007).  Revenue recognition errors are one of the leading causes 
of restatements from 1997-2006 (GAO 2007) and are associated with more negative stock price reactions 
and a higher likelihood of litigation than other restatements (Anderson and Yohn 2002; Wu 2003; 
Palmrose and Scholz 2004).  Other research finds that firms manipulate revenue to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks (Caylor 2008; Stubben 2006). 
14 Zhang (2005) also finds that accelerated revenue recognition results in less reliable revenue for her 
sample (i.e. larger accounts receivable errors and less reduced revenue predictability).   
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The first objective of this study is to investigate characteristics of firms that use 
the sell-in and sell-through methods.  Based on the fact that both methods are used in 
practice and the assumption that SAB 104 generally offers enough discretion for high 
technology firms to justify using either method, I expect that firms use the method they 
perceive offers the greatest net economic benefit.  I use prior accounting research and 
anecdotal evidence to identify potential costs and benefits of the sell- and the sell-
through methods.  I then offer hypotheses about firm characteristics that I expect to be 
associated with use of the revenue recognition methods. 
Costs and Benefits of the Revenue Recognition Methods 
 
Several commentators characterize the sell-in method as more aggressive than 
the sell-through method (Glass, Lewis & Co. 2004; Greenberg 2006).  However, the sell-
in method does offer benefits.  Because the sell-in method recognizes revenue upon 
delivery to distributors, it provides a more timely reflection of actual business 
transactions.  Texas Instruments gives this reason for using the sell-in method 
(Greenberg 2006).  Sell-in revenue recognition also provides information about expected 
product demand (i.e. future distributor resales).   
Potential costs of using the sell-in method arise from the estimations and 
discretion allowed under this method.  The requirement to maintain product return and 
 14 
pricing adjustment accruals creates the possibility of unintentional estimation errors. 15  
In addition, managers can manipulate performance by channel stuffing and/or adjusting 
product return and pricing adjustment allowances.  Both of these factors increase the risk 
of accounting misstatements (Glass, Lewis & Co. 2004).  For example, Symbol 
Technologies restated two years of prior financial statements due to a variety of revenue 
recognition issues, including selling prices that were later deemed undeterminable 
because of pricing adjustments subsequently awarded to distributors (Symbol 
Technologies 2002 10-K filing).  This company switched to the sell-through method as 
part of its financial restatement process. 
The benefits of using the sell-through method relate to its conservative nature.  
This method more accurately reflects end-user demand and offers no incentive to stuff 
the distribution channel.16  Accordingly, firms may use the sell-through method to signal 
the quality of their financial information.  Levine and Hughes (2005) model a setting 
where conservative accounting choices provide positive signals about future cash flows.  
Conservative accounting should also reduce the risk of shareholder litigation, which is 
typically associated with overstated rather than understated net assets and earnings 
(Kellog 1984; St. Pierre and Anderson 1984; Watts 2003). 
Obtaining the benefits of the sell-through method does come at a cost.  First, 
firms using the sell-through method depend on the reliability of distributor resale and 
                                                 
15 Some firms cite estimation difficulties due to frequent price changes and technological obsolescence as 
reasons for using the sell-through method (e.g. Intel 2007 10-K filing; Micron 2007 10-K filing; Supertex 
2007 10-K filing). 
16 Increased focus on end-user demand and reduction of distributor inventory were both mentioned by ON 
Semiconductor and International Rectifier when they announced plans to use the sell-through method (ON 
Semiconductor press release 4/25/01; International Rectifier conference call 8/4/08). 
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inventory data.17  Chipalkatti et al. (2007) note that it may be difficult to obtain 
distributor data, remove data errors, validate the data, and convert data received from 
multiple distributors into one consistent format.18  In order to deal with these issues, the 
sell-through revenue recognition process requires additional internal controls beyond 
those controls used for revenue recognition of non-distributor customer sales.  Second, 
practitioners have stated that it is difficult to find sell-through accounting resources.  
Sell-through firms admit to:  (1) advising other firms on sell-through accounting 
practices, and (2) using spreadsheets and home grown systems to facilitate sell-through 
accounting due to limited off the shelf software products that meet their needs.   
Empirical Predictions 
The costs and benefits discussion in the previous section leads to a number of 
predictions about associations between firm characteristics and use of the sell-in and 
sell-through methods.  The first characteristic I expect to be associated with the revenue 
recognition method used is a firm‘s capital requirements.  Firms with existing capital or 
need of new capital may use the sell-through method in order to signal a commitment to 
more conservative accounting.  Prior research finds that lenders benefit from 
conservative accounting by receiving more timely signals of default risk, and that 
lenders reward borrowers using conservative accounting with lower interest rates (e.g. 
Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008).  In addition, firms undergoing an initial public offering 
                                                 
17 Distributor data issues also affect sell-in firms‘ product return and pricing adjustment estimates.  
However, all revenue recognition for sell-through firms depends on distributor data.  I view problems with 
distributor data to be a greater risk for sell-through firms than for sell-in firms. 
18 Texas Instruments cites its lack of confidence in Asian distributor data as one reason it uses the sell-in 
method (Greenberg 2006), and a recent KPMG (2006) study indicates that 20 percent of resale reports 
from channel partners may contain missing data or errors.    
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have been found to report more conservatively than private firms suggesting that 
conservative accounting is valued by equity providers (Ball and Shivakumar 2008).  
Firms with ample capital may use the sell-through method because they attempted to 
obtain the benefits just described when they issued debt or equity in prior periods.   
 However, firms with existing capital or need of new capital may instead use the 
sell-in method because it offers greater opportunity to manipulate financial performance 
through accrual manipulation and/or channel stuffing activities.  Sweeney (1994) finds 
that firms with existing debt implement income increasing accounting changes in order 
to avoid debt covenant violations.  Other research suggests that firms needing new 
capital manage earnings by accelerating revenue recognition prior to issuing debt or 
equity (Bowen et al. 2002; Marquardt and Weidman 2004).  In both cases, firms attempt 
to mislead capital providers by reporting better financial performance than they 
otherwise would.  Due to the competing evidence with respect to the association 
between capital requirements and accounting methods, my first hypothesis is non-
directional:  
H1:  Use of the sell-in method is systematically related to firms’ capital 
requirements. 
The second characteristic I expect to be associated with firms‘ revenue 
recognition method is the level of incentive compensation available to management.  
Prior research on management compensation and accounting practices finds mixed 
results.  One stream of this research suggests that executives manage earnings in order to 
increase current period compensation.  Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that as equity 
 17 
incentives increase firms are more likely to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, and 
Matsunaga and Park (2001) find that CEO annual cash bonuses are significantly reduced 
if firms fail to meet quarterly earnings benchmarks in at least two quarters.  Other 
research finds strong positive associations between high equity incentives and both 
income increasing abnormal accruals (Cheng and Warfield 2005) and the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cornett et al. 2008).  Other 
studies suggest that firms are more likely to experience accounting restatements or fraud 
when equity incentives are high (e.g. Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007).   
However, another stream of research finds contrary evidence on the association 
between management incentive compensation and accounting practices.  Hribar and 
Nichols (2007) find that the positive association between equity incentives and absolute 
discretionary accruals does not hold after controlling for cash flow volatility.  Erickson 
et al. (2006) and Armstrong et al. (2008) find no evidence of an association between 
equity incentives and accounting fraud or restatements.  In fact, Armstrong et al. (2008) 
find evidence that accounting fraud is less likely when management‘s equity incentives 
are high, suggesting that equity incentives align manager and shareholder interests.  
Because it is unclear from prior research if firms with incentive compensation will use 
more aggressive or more conservative accounting methods, my second hypothesis is 
non-directional:  
H2:  Use of the sell-in method is systematically related to management incentive 
compensation. 
 
The third characteristic I expect to be associated with revenue recognition 
practices is firms‘ growth opportunities.  Growth opportunities increase uncertainty 
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because growth firms have options to make future investments that are difficult to 
observe (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).   Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that firms 
may enter into contracts that restrict managers‘ accounting choices in order to 
compensate for uncertainties associated with growth opportunities.  In addition to this 
expectation, uncertainty in general should result in more conservative accounting to 
reduce the likelihood of inappropriate payments to managers and/or shareholders 
(Ahmed et al. 2002; Watts 2003).  The FASB defines conservatism as ―a prudent 
reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business 
situations are adequately considered‖ (Concepts Statement No. 2, FASB 1980).  Based 
on the expectation that firms with higher growth opportunities, and thus more 
uncertainty, use more conservative accounting methods my third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H3:  As growth opportunities increase firms are less likely to use the sell-in 
method than the sell-through method. 
 
The firm characteristics discussed thus far can be viewed as incentives that that 
may be associated with firms‘ accounting methods.  However, accounting methods may 
also be associated with corporate governance mechanisms put in place to constrain or 
monitor managers.  Prior research suggests that corporate governance strength is 
associated with accounting choices, and that managers are more likely to exercise their 
accounting discretion to increase income when corporate governance is weak (e.g. 
Becker et al. 1998; Klein 2002; Altamuro et al. 2005; Bowen et al. 2008).  Prior research 
also suggests that accounting is increasingly conservative as corporate governance 
strength increases (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Garcia Lara et al. 
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2009).  Since the sell-through method is considered the more conservative approach and 
allows for less accounting discretion by management, my fourth hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H4:  Firms with strong corporate governance are less likely to use the sell-in 
method than the sell-through method. 
 
While corporate governance strength may directly affect firms‘ accounting 
methods as predicted by Hypothesis 4, it is also possible that corporate governance 
indirectly affects firms‘ accounting practices.  An indirect effect would occur if 
corporate governance weakens or strengthens the associations predicted in Hypotheses 
1-3.  For example, assume that use of the sell-in method is positively associated with 
management incentive compensation because managers prefer an accounting method 
that allows more opportunities to manage earnings.  Strong governance mechanisms‘ 
demand for conservative accounting may reduce managers‘ willingness to choose more 
aggressive accounting practices, thus weakening the association between use of the sell-
in method and management incentives.    While many accounting studies examine the 
direct effect of corporate governance by simply adding governance proxies to the 
empirical model, some recent accounting studies examine the indirect effect of 
governance by partitioning samples based on corporate governance strength or by 
examining the interaction of governance proxies with other variables of interest (e.g. 
DeFond and Hung 2004; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Lee et al. 2008).  Although these 
studies address different research questions, they typically find evidence that the 
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predicted associations between dependent and independent variables are significantly 
affected by corporate governance strength.19   
The board of directors, institutional shareholders, and the external auditor all act 
as monitors over management (Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; 
Beasley and Salterio 2001).  I expect that the monitoring strength of these parties will 
impact the association between incentives and accounting methods used by managers.  
Under strong monitoring, the accounting methods used will likely be influenced by both 
management incentives and demands of the corporate governance mechanisms.  Thus, I 
expect that corporate governance strength will affect the associations examined in the 
first three hypotheses.  Because Hypothesis 4 predicts that strong governance 
mechanisms will demand conservative accounting and less accounting discretion, my 
fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
H5:  Firms with capital requirements, management incentives, and growth 
opportunities are less likely to use the sell-in method when corporate governance 
is strong than when corporate governance is weak. 
 
Financial Information Quality 
The costs and benefits of the sell-in and sell-through methods discussed earlier 
suggest that relevance and reliability of information produced under the two methods 
may differ.  Both methods can suffer from unintended reductions in reliability.  Under 
the sell-in method, managers may misestimate product return and/or pricing adjustment 
accruals.  Under the sell-through method, revenues may be less reliable if:  (1) 
                                                 
19 For example, DeFond and Hung (2004) find that the association between poor firm performance and 
likelihood of CEO turnover is stronger when strong country-level corporate governance mechanisms exist.  
This finding suggests that corporate governance plays an important role in the identification and removal 
of poorly performing CEOs.  
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distributor inventory and resale data contain errors that are not detected by management, 
(2) distributor inventory and resale data are not updated on a timely basis, or (3) proper 
internal controls do not exist for this revenue recognition process.  The sell-in method 
may also yield unreliable revenue estimates if managers use their discretion to enhance 
performance through channel stuffing or accrual manipulation.   
Financial statement users may perceive relevance differences between the two 
methods.  The sell-in method provides timely information about expected future demand 
but not current end-user demand.  On the other hand, the sell-through method reflects 
end-user demand and is a signal of conservative accounting practices.  Due to potential 
relevance and reliability differences between the sell-in and sell-through methods, it is 
an empirical question if financial information quality differs between the two methods.  
My final hypothesis is non-directional: 
H6:  Financial information quality differs between the sell-in and sell-through 
revenue recognition methods. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND REVENUE RECOGNITION 
Research Design 
 U.S. GAAP requires that firms disclose their revenue recognition policies (APB 
1972; SEC 1999, 2003).  Each year I classify firms as using the sell-in or sell-through 
revenue recognition method for sales to distributors based on their 10-K revenue 
recognition disclosures.  Sell-In is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm uses 
only the sell-in method to recognize revenue for distributor sales and equal to zero if the 
firm uses the sell-through method to recognize revenue for all sales to one or more 
distributors. 20  Because this definition of Sell-In classifies firms using both the sell-in 
and sell-through methods as sell-through firms, it should bias against finding results in 
all my empirical tests.  Appendix A contains examples of revenue recognition 
disclosures and classification of the method as either sell-in or sell-through. 
 I use the following logistic regression model to test Hypotheses 1-4 which 
predict the characteristics of firms that use the sell-in method21: 
Sell-Init = α0 + α1 Levit + α2 IntCoverit + α3 RaisedCapitalit + α4 Bonusit  
                + α5 EquityIncentit + α6 R&Dit + α7 MTBit + α8 Govit + α9 LnAssetit  
                + α10 ROAit +  α11 Retvolit + α12 Ageit + α13 Compit + ε               (1) 
 
where 
                                                 
20 Firms may use the sell-in method as their primary method for revenue recognition but use the sell-
through method in order to recognize revenue for new products that have little or no sales history.  SAB 
104 would require the sell-through method for new product sales because no historical information is 
available to estimate product returns and pricing adjustments for these new products (SEC 2003).  I 
classify firms in this situation as sell-in firms because the revenue recognition method used is related to 
the product sold and not the customer. 
21 The sample used to estimate Model 1 includes multiple annual observations per firm.  Since I expect 
revenue recognition method usage to be relatively sticky over time, I also estimate Model 1 with only one 
observation per firm.  Results of this supplemental test are discussed at the end of this section. 
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Sell-In = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm uses the sell-in revenue 
recognition method for sales to distributors, and otherwise 0; 
  
Lev = long-term debt scaled by fiscal year-end total assets; 
  
IntCover = interest expense scaled by operating income before depreciation; 
  
RaisedCapital = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm issued new debt and equity 
greater than 20 percent of average annual assets during the current fiscal 
year, and otherwise 0; 
  
Bonus = the CEO‘s annual bonus compensation scaled by the sum of the CEO‘s 
annual salary and bonus, averaged over years t-2 through t;  
  
EquityIncent = the percentage of a CEO‘s total compensation that would result from a 
one percent increase in stock price, averaged over years t-2 through t; 
  
R&D = R&D expenses scaled by fiscal year-end total assets; 
  
MTB = the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at fiscal-
year end; 
  
Gov = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is classified as having strong 
corporate governance, and otherwise 0; 
  
LnAsset = the natural log of fiscal year-end total assets;  
  
ROA = net income scaled by average total assets; 
  
Retvol = the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the prior fiscal-year 
(minimum of 100 daily observations for each firm-year to calculate the 
daily stock return); 
  
Age = the number of years since the firm was first listed in CRSP; and 
  
Comp = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm‘s primary industry is 
computers, and otherwise 0. 
  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that an association exists between capital requirements and 
use of the sell-in method.  I use ―capital requirement‖ to encompass the ability to 
maintain existing capital as well as obtain additional capital.  Lev proxies for the firm‘s 
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debt level which has been found to be significantly associated with accounting choice 
across a variety of studies (Christie 1990; Fields et al. 2001).  IntCover proxies for the 
risk of debt covenant violation because Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that the interest 
coverage ratio is one of the most commonly used accounting measures in debt 
agreements.  RaisedCapital proxies for the firm‘s need to raise new equity and/or debt, 
and prior research suggests that firms requiring new external financing accelerate 
revenue recognition (Bowen et al. 2002; Marquardt and Weidman 2004).  Positive 
(negative) and significant coefficients on Lev, IntCover, and RaisedCapital would 
suggest that firms are more (less) likely to use the sell-in method as capital requirements 
increase.   
Hypothesis 2 predicts that an association exists between management incentive 
compensation and use of the sell-in method.  Bonus captures the CEO‘s non-salary cash 
compensation while EquityIncent captures potential equity related incentive 
compensation for the CEO.  I include proxies for both types of compensation since prior 
research finds that associations often differ between accounting methods used by firms 
and the two types of incentive compensation (e.g. Aboody et al. 2000; Aboody et al. 
2004; Efendi et al. 2007).  Average values of the measures over the past three years are 
used instead of current year values in an attempt to capture the persistence of executive 
compensation over time.  Positive (negative) and significant coefficients on Bonus and 
EquityIncent suggest that firms are more (less) likely to use the sell-in method as 
management incentive compensation increases. 
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that use of the sell-in method is less likely as growth 
opportunities increase.  R&D and MTB proxy for growth opportunities.  Intuitively, 
R&D expenditures likely lead to growth opportunities (Ahmed 1994).  MTB is also 
likely to capture growth opportunities (Lindenberg and Ross 1981).  However, a 
limitation of MTB is that it also proxies for economic rents earned on assets-in-place 
(Lindenberg and Ross 1981; Ahmed 1994; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).  I expect 
negative and significant coefficients for both R&D and MTB.   
Hypothesis 4 predicts that use of the sell-in method is less likely when corporate 
governance is strong.  Gov proxies for corporate governance strength and is defined 
based on board size and independence, institutional ownership, and industry specialist 
auditor usage.  Stronger governance, or oversight, is suggested by smaller boards (Lipton 
and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993), higher board independence (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002), 
higher institutional ownership (Shleifer and Vishny 1986), and use of an industry 
specialist auditor (Owhoso et al. 2002; Balsam et al. 2003).  A detailed definition of Gov 
is available in Table 1.  I expect a negative association between Gov and Sell-In.   
The remaining variables in Model 1 control for other firm characteristics that 
may be associated with firms‘ revenue recognition methods.  I control for firm size 
(LnAsset), profitability (ROA), business uncertainty (Retvol), age (Age), and industry 
(Comp). 22  Table 1 provides detailed definitions of all variables included in Model 1.  
                                                 
22 Ideally, I would also like to control for how much of the firms‘ revenue comes from distributor 
customers (i.e. the importance of the distributor to the seller‘s business).  I attempted to hand collect this 
information at the same time I reviewed 10-K filings in order to classify firms as using the sell-in method 
or the sell-through method.  Some firms report the percentage of annual revenue attributable to all 
distributors or some set of top distributors (i.e. top 2 or top 3) either in aggregate or separately by 
distributor.  Other firms do not provide any information about the percentage of revenue attributable to 
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Hypothesis 5 predicts that firms with capital requirements, incentive 
compensation, and growth opportunities are less likely to use the sell-in method when 
corporate governance is strong than when it is weak.  I use the following logistic 
regression model to test this hypothesis: 
Sell-Init = α0 + α1 Levit + α2 Lev×Govit + α3 IntCoverit + α4 IntCoverit×Govit  
                + α5 RaisedCapitalit + α6 RaisedCapitalit×Govit + α7 Bonusit  
                + α8 Bonusit×Govit + α9 EquityIncentit + α10 EquityIncentit×Govit  
                + α11 R&Dit + α12 R&Dit×Govit  + α13 MTBit + α14 MTBit×Govit   
                + α15 Govit + α16 LnAssetit + α17 ROAit + α18 Retvolit + α19 Ageit  
                + α20 Compit + ε                                                                           (2) 
 
Under Hypothesis 5, I expect negative and significant coefficients for each of the 
interaction terms between Gov and other variables of interest.   
Sample Selection 
 
Table 2 presents the steps utilized to obtain a sample of firms.  I first obtain all 
firm-year observations from the Compustat Annual database for 2001-2005 in the 
computer and electronic equipment industries.  I choose this time period because SAB 
101 or SAB 104 was in effect for the entire period.  SAB 101 offered additional 
guidance on revenue recognition disclosures, and revenue recognition disclosures may 
have been less reliable prior to the issuance of this guidance.  I select the computer and 
electronic equipment industries because these industries use sell-in and sell-through 
accounting (Glass, Lewis & Co. 2004; Greenberg 2006; Chipalkatti et al. 2007).23 After 
these restrictions, 4,515 firm-year observations remain.   
                                                                                                                                                
distributor customers.  Due to the variation in reporting methods and the fact that many firms choose not 
to disclose information about the percentage of revenue attributable to distributor customers, I was not 
able to obtain a measure of revenue from distributors to include in Model 1. 
23 I follow Fama and French‘s (1997) industry classifications, as updated on Kenneth French‘s website to 
reflect 49 industries, such that computers includes SIC 3570-3579, 3680-3689, and 3695; electronic 
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I exclude observations missing data required for the firm characteristic and 
revenue recognition method model (Model 1).  Specifically, I delete observations 
missing necessary Compustat data (1,470 observations), ExecuComp data (2,341 
observations), RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) data (141 observations), and CRSP data (1 
observations).  These restrictions result in a sample of 562 firm-year observations.  I 
hand collect revenue recognition disclosures for these firms.  I exclude 83 firm-year 
observations because either the firm does not sell products to distributors or an annual 
10-K filing was unavailable.  The final sample consists of 479 firm-year observations for 
119 unique firms.24 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for firm characteristic and 
revenue recognition method variables.  The sell-in method is used by 66 percent of the 
firm-year observations while the sell-through method is used by 34 percent of the firm-
year observations.  Nine of the 119 unique firms switched methods during the years they 
appear in my sample.  In all but one case, the firms switched from the sell-in method to 
the sell-through method.  All remaining variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 
one percent except IntCover, natural logs, and indicator variables.  IntCover is capped at 
                                                                                                                                                
equipment includes SIC 3622, 3661-3666, 3669, 3670-3679, 3810, and 3812 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/).  The definition of computer industry used in 
this study excludes software firms.  This choice is made because the revenue recognition decisions made 
by software firms are often not easily comparable to the revenue recognition decisions of other firms in 
this study due to the multiple-element arrangements inherent in many software sales. 
24 In addition to the computer and electronic equipment industries, Glass, Lewis and Co. (2004) also 
suggest that the sell-in and sell-through methods are used by pharmaceutical companies.  However, they 
indicate that nearly all of the pharmaceutical firms they examine use the sell-in method.  I hand collected 
revenue recognition disclosures for 195 pharmaceutical firm-year observations during the sample period 
and found that 97 percent of these observations used the sell-in method.  Due to the small amount of 
variation in revenue recognition method use among these firms, I exclude the pharmaceutical industry 
from all analyses reported in this study. 
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2.0, and the ratio is set to 2.0 for all observations with negative operating income before 
depreciation.  Based on mean and median tests, the univariate statistics indicate that sell-
in firms are significantly older, have higher leverage, and are more likely to have issued 
new debt or equity in the past year than sell-through firms.  However, sell-in firms have 
significantly lower R&D expenditures, lower stock return volatility (Retvol), and lower 
CEO equity incentives than sell-through firms.  Thirty-six percent of the sample firms 
are classified as having strong corporate governance, and sell-in and sell-through firms 
do not significantly differ with respect to governance strength. 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics by industry.  Use of the sell-in method 
significantly differs between the two industries:  81 percent of computer firms and 62 
percent of electronic equipment firms use the sell-in method.  Sell-in usage differences 
between the computer and electronic equipment industries may be due to differences in 
the importance of distributors for these industries.  As noted in footnote 25, the amount 
of manufacturer revenue attributable to distributor customers is not reported by all 
manufacturers.  However, for sample firms that did report this information, a firm‘s top 
distributor accounts for 12 percent and 26 percent of total revenue, on average, for firms 
in the computer and electronic equipment industries respectively.  This suggests that use 
of the sell-in method may be more likely in industries with fewer sales through 
distributors.25  Other than use of the sell-in method, the computer and electronics firms 
                                                 
25 Commentators suggest that use of the sell-in method decreased in the computer and electronic 
equipment industries over the past decade, but this trend has not occurred in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Glass, Lewis and Co. 2004; Greenberg 2006).  Use of the sell-in method appears to be an accepted 
practice in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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are relatively similar and only significantly differ with respect to size and CEO equity 
incentives.   
Panel C of Table 3 presents correlations for the firm characteristic and revenue 
recognition method variables.  These univariate statistics support many of the inferences 
suggested by the mean and median statistics.  The correlations suggest that use of the 
sell-in method is more likely for older firms and firms with higher leverage, but less 
likely as business uncertainty (Retvol), R&D expenditures, equity incentives, and MTB 
increase.  All variance inflation factors are below 3.0, suggesting that multicollinearity 
will not pose a problem in the multivariate analyses. 
Multivariate Analyses 
 Table 4 presents results for the models that examine firm characteristics and 
revenue recognition methods.  Since the sample used for these analyses contains 
multiple observations for each firm, Z-statistics are calculated using Rogers‘ (1993) 
standard errors clustered by firm to correct for correlated firm-level errors.  Using the 
sample average of 66 percent as the probability that a firm will use the sell-in method, 
Model 1 classifies 73 percent of all observations correctly, 73 percent of known sell-in 
observations correctly, and 75 percent of known sell-through observations correctly.  
The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is 80 percent, 
suggesting that the model has excellent predictive power (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
2000).26   
                                                 
26 The area under the ROC curve measures the probability that a randomly selected sell-in firm would have 
a higher fitted value from the model than a randomly selected sell-through firm.   
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Model 1 examines Hypotheses 1-4.  Hypothesis 1 predicts an association 
between Sell-In and firm capital requirements.  The results for Model 1 indicate that the 
Lev, IntCover, and RaisedCapital coefficients are all insignificantly different from zero.  
These results suggest that use of the sell-in method is not influenced by firms‘ capital 
requirements.27  Hypothesis 2 predicts an association between Sell-In and management 
incentive compensation.  Both Bonus and EquityIncent are insignificantly different from 
zero.28  These results suggest use of the sell-in method is not sensitive to bonus and 
equity incentives.  Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative association between Sell-In and 
growth opportunities.  R&D is negatively and significantly associated with Sell-In (p < 
0.01), but the MTB coefficient is insignificantly different from zero.29  The insignificant 
MTB coefficient is not surprising since MTB is not a clean proxy for growth 
opportunities, as discussed in earlier in this section.  These results provide some 
evidence that use of the sell-in method is less likely for firms with high growth 
opportunities.   
Hypothesis 4 predicts that use of the sell-in method is less likely when corporate 
governance is strong.  The negative and significant Gov coefficient supports this 
prediction (p = 0.01).  With respect to the control variables, Age and Comp are both 
positively and significantly associated with Sell-In (p = 0.03 for both coefficients).  The 
                                                 
27 In an untabulated test, I estimated Model 1 separately by industry.  None of the capital requirement 
proxies are significant for the electronic equipment industry.  However, the Lev coefficient is positive and 
significant (p = 0.04) and the RaisedCapital coefficient is negative and significant (p = 0.07) for the 
computer industry. 
28 Results are unchanged if current year Bonus and EquityIncent measures are used instead of three year 
averages.  Excluding the industry indicator variable or all control variables from Model 1 does result in a 
negative and significant EquityIncent coefficient (p = 0.05 and p = 0.01, respectively).   
29 When Model 1 is estimated separately by industry, the R&D coefficient is negative and significant for 
the electronic equipment industry. 
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Age coefficient suggests that older firms may use the sell-in method because they likely 
have a more reliable sales history which they can use to estimate product returns and 
pricing adjustments.  In summary, the results obtained from estimating Model 1 provide 
support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 only.  
Model 2 examines Hypothesis 5 and also re-examines Hypotheses 1-4.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that firms with capital requirements, management incentives, and 
growth opportunities are less likely to use the sell-in method when corporate governance 
is strong than when corporate governance is weak.  Model 2 classifies 75 percent of all 
observations correctly, 75 percent of known sell-in observations correctly, and 73 
percent of known sell-through observations correctly.  The area under the ROC curve is 
82 percent.   
In terms of the capital requirement proxies, RaisedCapital is positively and 
significantly associated with Sell-In (p = 0.07), and RaisedCapital×Gov is negatively 
and significantly associated with Sell-In (p = 0.04). These results indicate that firms with 
weak governance that raised new capital are more likely to use the sell-in method than 
the sell-through method.  However, when corporate governance is strong, firms raising 
new capital are significantly less likely to use the sell-in method than firms with weak 
governance, and financing is not associated with the revenue recognition method for 
strong governance firms (RaisedCapital + RaisedCapital×Gov).  These results support 
Hypotheses 1 and 5.   
In terms of the management incentive proxies, Bonus×Gov and 
EquityIncent×Gov are both negatively and significantly associated with Sell-In (p =0.02 
 32 
and p = 0.01, respectively).  The main effect of the Bonus and EquityIncent coefficients 
for firms with strong governance (Bonus + BonusGov and EquityIncent + 
EquityIncentGov) are also negative and significant (p = 0.03 and p = 0.01, 
respectively).  These results indicate that use of the sell-in method is sensitive to the 
amount of cash and equity based management incentive compensation, but only when 
corporate governance is strong.  These results support Hypotheses 2 and 5.   
Interactions between Gov and growth opportunity proxies are insignificantly 
different from zero, yet the main effect of R&D remains negative and significant (p < 
0.01).  This result supports Hypothesis 3 and indicates that as R&D expenditures 
increase firms are less likely to use the sell-in method regardless of corporate 
governance strength.  After interacting Gov with the capital requirement, management 
incentive, and growth opportunity proxies, the main effect of governance is 
insignificantly different from zero.30   
             In summary, the evidence presented in Table 4 provides some support for 
Hypothesis 1-5.  Firms that raise new capital are more likely to use the sell-in method than 
the sell-through method when corporate governance is weak.  However, strong corporate 
governance reduces the association between Sell-In and the proxy for new capital.  Use 
of the sell-in method is less likely as bonus and equity incentives increase, but only for 
firms with strong corporate governance.  Finally, use of the sell-in method is less likely 
                                                 
30 Inferences with respect to all interactions in Model 2 are unchanged if the industry indicator variable or 
all other control variables are excluded from the model.  I also substitute revenue volatility (based on the 
prior 12 quarters) for stock return volatility, and inferences related to the variables of interest and 
interactions are unchanged.  In this specification, the revenue volatility coefficient is positive and 
significant (p = 0.06). 
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as R&D expenditures increase and for firms with strong corporate governance.  
Although prior research examines the association between revenue recognition methods 
and corporate governance (Bowen et al. 2002; Altamuro et al. 2005), I show that strong 
governance is not simply additive.  In this study, the associations between revenue 
recognition methods and firm characteristics differ based on corporate governance 
strength.31 
Supplemental Analysis 
 As mentioned previously, only 9 of 119 sample firms changed their revenue 
recognition method during the years they are included in the analyses.  This indicates 
that the revenue recognition choice is sticky over time for my sample firms.  As an 
alternative test, I re-estimate Model 2 with only one observation per firm.  Untabulated 
results are consistent using either the first or last year that each firm appears in the 
sample.  Use of the sell-in method is significantly less likely as cash bonus compensation 
(Bonus) and R&D expenditures increase, regardless of corporate governance strength.  
Use of the sell-in method is less likely as equity incentives (EquityIncent) increase, but 
only when corporate governance is strong.  Finally, Age remains positively and 
significantly associated with Sell-In.  None of the capital requirement proxies and their 
                                                 
31 Because the definition of Sell-In classifies firms that use the sell-through method exclusively as well as 
firms that use both sell-in and sell-through methods as sell-through firms, I also estimate a multinomial 
logit model which differentiates between exclusive use of sell-in, exclusive use of sell-through, and 
combined use of both methods.  Only 40 of the 479 observations exclusively use the sell-through method, 
which results in low power for comparisons of these observations to the other categories of revenue 
recognition methods used.  However, inferences gleaned from the analysis contrasting firms exclusively 
using the sell-in method to those firms that use both sell-in and sell-through are largely consistent with the 
results tabulated in Table 4.   
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interactions with Gov are significantly associated with Sell-In when only one observation 
per firm is used to estimate the model. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION QUALITY AND REVENUE RECOGNITION  
Ability of Accounting Information to Predict Future Cash Flows 
Research Design 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that the quality of financial information differs between the 
sell-in and sell-through methods.  The first construct of financial information quality that 
I examine is the ability of accrual accounting information to predict future cash flows.  
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 posits that ―financial reporting 
should provide information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amounts, 
timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise‖ (FASB 
1978, para. 37).  If distributors settle accounts receivable shortly after they receive 
inventory, current period cash flows would be the same under the sell-in and sell-
through methods.  However, it is unclear if the ability to predict future cash flows differs 
between the two methods.    
Accounting studies often examine the ability of current period earnings to predict 
future cash flows (e.g. Dechow et al. 1998; Barth, Cram, and Nelson 2001; Altamuro et 
al. 2005).  Prior research implies the following cash flow and earnings models for my 
study: 
OCFi,t+1 = α0 + α1 Sell-Init + α2 Earningsit + α3 Sell-InitEarningstt + ε          (3) 
 
OCFi,t+1 = α0 + α1 Sell-Init + α2 Earningsit + α3 Sell-InitEarningstt + ε   (4) 
 
where 
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OCF = quarterly cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; 
  
Earnings = quarterly earnings scaled by total assets; 
  
OCF = change in quarterly cash flow from operations from the same quarter of 
the preceding fiscal year, scaled by total assets, and; 
  
Earnings = change in quarterly earnings from the same quarter of the preceding 
fiscal year, scaled by total assets. 
  
Sell-In is as previously defined.32   
 
Model 3 examines the association between earnings levels and future cash flows levels.  
Model 4 controls for seasonal effects on earnings and cash flows by examining the 
association between unexpected earnings (i.e. seasonal change) and unexpected future 
cash flows.    
Because the timing of revenue recognition for sales to distributors differs 
between the sell-in and sell-through methods, the accounts primarily affected by these 
methods are revenue and cost of goods sold.  Gross margin is the first subtotal on the 
income statement that captures this information.  Although earnings also captures 
revenue and cost of goods sold information, many other line items impact earnings that 
are not affected by the revenue recognition method used.  Decomposing earnings into 
gross margin and other expenses allows me to examine how use of the sell-in method 
affects the association between gross margin and future cash flows.33   
Because the high technology industries included in this study are likely to 
experience seasonality in earnings, I examine Hypothesis 6 with a model similar to 
                                                 
32 Because a firm‘s choice to use either the sell-in or sell-through is endogeneity, I conduct supplemental 
tests at the end of this section to correct for potential endogeneity in all financial information quality tests. 
33 Although other line items below gross margin will be affected by use of the sell-in or sell-through 
method, such as income taxes and management compensation, the vast majority of the impact from the 
revenue recognition method should occur in gross margin. 
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Model 4, after decomposing earnings into gross margin and other expenses.  I use the 
following model to determine if the ability of accrual accounting information to predict 
future cash flows differs between sell-in and sell-through firms, controlling for fixed 
firm and time effects: 
OCFi,t+1 = α0 + α1 Sell-Init + α2 GrossMarginit + α3 OtherExpit  
                    + α4 Sell-InitGrossMargintt  + α5 Sell-InitOtherExptt + ε    (5) 
 
where  
 
ΔGrossMargin =   change in quarterly gross margin from the same quarter of the 
preceding fiscal year, scaled by total assets, and; 
  
ΔOtherExp =  change in quarterly other expenses (gross margin minus earnings) 
from the same quarter of the preceding fiscal year, scaled by total assets. 
  
The main variable of interest in Model 5 is Sell-InΔGrossMargin, which is used to test 
Hypothesis 6.  A positive (negative) and significant coefficient on Sell-
InΔGrossMargin indicates that use of the sell-in method increases (decreases) the 
ability of unexpected gross margin to predict unexpected future cash flows compared to 
the sell-through method.  Stated differently, a positive (negative) and significant 
coefficient on Sell-InΔGrossMargin suggests that use of the sell-in method increases 
(decreases) financial information quality.  
Multivariate Analysis 
 Estimation results for the regression of seasonal changes in cash flows during 
quarter t+1 on seasonal changes in gross margin and other operating expenses during 
quarter t are presented in Table 5.  The sample consists of quarterly data for firm-year 
observations included in the analysis of firm characteristics and revenue recognition 
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practices.  ΔGrossMargin is positively and significantly associated with the seasonal 
change in future cash flows (p < 0.01) and ΔOtherExp is negatively and significantly 
associated with the seasonal change in future cash flows (p < 0.01).   The main variable 
of interest, Sell-In×ΔGrossMargin, is negatively and significantly associated with 
ΔOCFt+1 (p < 0.01).  This result suggests that the ability of unexpected gross margin 
information to predict unexpected future cash flows is significantly lower for sell-in 
firms than for sell-through firms.34  This finding supports Hypothesis 6, which predicts 
that financial information quality differs between the sell-in and sell-through methods. 
The inferences drawn from Table 5 are consistent with Forester‘s (2008) finding 
that accrual accounting information better predicts future cash flows for firms that defer 
revenue recognition.  Forester (2008) initially examines cash flow predictability 
immediately following a revenue recognition policy change.  Consistent with Altamuro 
et al. (2005) he finds a decline in the ability of accounting information to predict future 
cash flows under a deferred revenue recognition method.  However, Forester (2008) 
finds that this initial decline in predictability is later reversed.  Since I do not identify 
when firms begin using the sell-in or sell-through method and very few of my sample 
firms change their revenue recognition method during the sample years, my analysis is 
more like the subsequent periods studied by Forester (2008) than the initial reaction 
studied by Altamuro et al. (2005). 
                                                 
34 Inference are unchanged if average total assets is used as the scalar for all accounting variables in Model 
5.  As a sensitivity test, I also use a levels specification of Model 5, where the dependent variable is one, 
two, three, or four-quarter ahead cumulative cash flows.  The interaction between Sell-In and 
GrossMargin is negative and significant with a one-tailed test when the dependent variable is four-quarter 
ahead cumulative cash flows.  Lack of significant results for the other quarters is likely due to the fact that 
this specification does not control for the impact of seasonal differences on operating performance.  
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Association between Accounting Information and Stock Returns 
Research Design 
The second construct of financial information quality that I examine relates to the 
association between accounting information and stock returns.  Since stock prices reflect 
economic events more promptly than accounting information, accounting information is 
considered more timely if it is more strongly associated with contemporaneous stock 
returns (Ball et al. 2000; Francis et al. 2006).  It is unclear how the market responds to 
sell-in and sell-through accounting news and which method produces more ―timely‖ 
information. 
I use the following regression model to study the timeliness of accounting 
information under the sell-in and sell-through methods, controlling for fixed firm and 
time effects. 
GrossMarginit/MVEi,t-1 = α0 + α1 AdjRetit + α2 Sell-Init + α3 Negit + α4 Betait  
                                         + α5 MTBit  + α6 Sizeit + α7 Persistit  
                                         + α8 AdjRetit×Sell-Init + α9 AdjRetit×Negit   
                                         + α10 AdjRetit×Betait  + α11 AdjRetit×MTBit  
                                                             + α12 AdjRetit×Sizeit  + α13 AdjRetit×Persistit + ε   (6) 
 
where 
 
GrossMargin/MVE = quarterly gross margin, scaled by market value of equity at the 
beginning of the quarter; 
  
AdjRet = cumulative stock returns beginning 2 days after the prior quarter‘s 
earnings announcement and ending one day after the current 
quarter‘s earnings announcement, adjusted by the value weighted 
market index in CRSP; 
  
Neg = an indicator variable equal to 1 if AdjRet is less than 0, and 
otherwise 0. 
  
  
 40 
Beta = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm‘s systematic risk is 
greater than the sample median for the quarter; and otherwise 0; 
  
MTB = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the market-to-book ratio is 
greater than the sample median for the quarter, and otherwise 0; 
  
Size = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm‘s natural log of assets at 
the beginning of the quarter is greater than the sample median for 
the quarter, and otherwise 0; and 
  
Persist = an indicator variable equal to 1 if gross margin persistence is 
greater than the sample median for the quarter, and otherwise 0. 
  
Sell-In is as previously defined.   
 
          Model 6 is similar to the model Zhang (2005) uses to examine the timeliness of 
accounting information around a revenue recognition standard change for software 
firms.  Zhang (2005) uses revenue as her dependent variable but I use gross margin 
because both revenue and cost of goods sold are affected by the sell-in and sell-through 
methods.   
I include five controls for factors expected to affect the association between 
accounting information and stock returns (Collins and Kothari 1989; Basu 1997).  Neg 
proxies for a bad news signal reflected in stock returns.  Beta proxies for the firm‘s 
systematic risk.  MTB proxies for growth opportunities.  Persist proxies for the 
persistence of gross margin based on a seasonal ARIMA model.  Finally, I control for 
firm size (Size).  Each of these proxies is included in Model 6 and interacted with the 
market-adjusted stock returns for the quarter (AdjRet).  Detailed definitions of all 
variables contained in Model 6 are included in Table 1. 
The main variable of interest in Model 6 is AdjRetSell-In, which tests 
Hypothesis 6.  A positive (negative) and significant coefficient on AdjRetSell-In 
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indicates that use of the sell-in method increases (decreases) the timeliness of accounting 
information compared to the sell-through method.  Thus, a positive (negative) and 
significant coefficient on AdjRetSell-In suggests that use of the sell-in method increases 
(decreases) the quality of financial information.   
Multivariate Analysis 
Estimation results for the regression of gross margin on market-adjusted stock 
returns and control variables are presented in Table 6.  The sample consists of quarterly 
data for firm-year observations included in the analysis of firm characteristics and 
revenue recognition practices. 
 The AdjRet coefficient is positive and significant (p < 0.01).  In terms of the control 
variables, MTB, Persist, AdjRet×MTB, and AdjRet×Persist are all negatively and 
significantly associated with gross margin.  The main variable of interest, AdjRet×Sell-
In, is negatively and significantly associated with gross margin (p = 0.03). 35  This result 
supports Hypothesis 6 and suggests that gross margin information reported under the 
sell-in method is actually less timely, or does a poorer job of reflecting information 
already incorporated into stock returns, than gross margin information reported under the 
sell-through method.   
Although Altamuro et al. (2005) and Forester (2008) do not explicitly examine 
the timeliness of accounting information under different revenue recognition methods, 
                                                 
35 I conduct two sensitivity tests with respect to the this analysis.  First, I estimate Model 6 without fixed 
effects.  The adjusted R2 drops from 0.74 reported in Table 6 to 0.23.  The AdjRet×Sell-In coefficient 
remains negative but is insignificantly different from zero.  Due to the increased explanatory power when 
fixed effects are included, I base my inferences on the Model 6 specification reported in Table 6.  Second, 
I estimate Model 6 with seasonal change in gross margin scaled by beginning of quarter MVE as the 
dependent variable.  The adjusted R2 of this fixed effects model is 0.23, and the AdjRet×Sell-In coefficient 
is negative, but insignificantly different from zero. 
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Zhang (2005) examines timeliness for software firms before and after the adoption of 
SOP 91-1.  She finds that revenue information is more timely when firms recognize 
revenue early.  In contrast, I find that revenue recognition is more timely when firms 
delay revenue recognition.   
The results reported in my study may differ from Zhang (2005) for at least two 
important reasons.  First, Zhang (2005) examines revenue recognition methods for 
software sales made to end customers while I examine revenue recognition methods for 
product sales made to distributors.  While distributors attempt to anticipate end customer 
demand, they are not the end users of the products.  In addition, sales agreements for end 
customers and distributors are likely to differ with respect to product return privileges 
and the possibility of future pricing adjustments.  The timeliness of revenue information 
could be affected by both of these factors. Second, the transparency of revenue 
recognition disclosures changed dramatically in the past decade.  Firms were not 
required to disclose their revenue recognition policies until SAB 101 went into effect.36  
Prior to SAB 101, firms only disclosed revenue recognition policies if they were deemed 
―significant.‖  Since Zhang‘s (2005) sample period occurs entirely before SAB 101 
while my sample period occurs entirely after SAB 101, it is unclear how disclosure 
transparency differences between the sample periods may have affected the timeliness of 
revenue information.   
                                                 
36 Zhang (2005) suggests that ―one reason for the paucity of research in [the revenue recognition] area is 
the difficulty in obtaining data related to revenue recognition policies.‖  For this reason, many revenue 
recognition studies examine periods before and after standard changes that prompted firms to recognize 
cumulative effects adjustments or disclose additional revenue recognition information (e.g. Altamuro et al. 
2005; Zhang 2005; Forester 2008; Srivastava 2008). 
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In summary, the results presented in both Tables 5 and 6 support Hypothesis 6 
and suggest that the financial information quality is lower under the sell-in method than 
the sell-through method. 
Supplemental Analyses 
Use of the sell-in or sell-through method is an endogenous choice made by firms.  
Econometrically, an endogeneity problem would occur in the financial information 
quality tests if the firm characteristics associated with Sell-In are also correlated with the 
dependent variables in Models 5 and 6.  This could cause Sell-In to be correlated with 
the error term, meaning the expected value of the error term differs from zero and OLS 
assumptions are violated (Wooldridge 2002; Greene 2003).  Because the potentially 
endogenous variable is an indicator variable, I re-estimate Models 5 and 6  and use the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage approach to correct for potential endogeneity (Heckman 
1979; Wooldridge 2002).   
For each potentially endogenous model, I regress Sell-In on the accounting 
variables in the OLS regression model and all independent variables from Model 2.  The 
independent variables from Model 2 act as instrument variables.37  The logit results 
allow me to calculate inverse Mills ratios, which equal the standard normal density 
function divided by the cumulative distribution function.  I include the appropriate 
                                                 
37 In order to appropriately use the two-stage approach, at least one exogenous instrument variable must be 
included in the first stage that is not included in the second stage, and the exogenous instrument variable 
should not be associated with the dependent variable in the second stage model (e.g. Heckman 1979; 
Wooldridge 2002).  I use all independent variables from Model 2 as possible instrument variables in the 
first stage, but focus on the variables significantly associated with Sell-In as possible instruments.  I find 
that Age is an appropriate instrument variable for the cash flow analysis while RaisedCapital is an 
appropriate instrument for the timeliness analysis.  Age is not significantly correlated with ΔOCF, and Age 
is not significantly associated with ΔOCF if included in Model 5.  Meanwhile, RaisedCapital is not 
significantly correlated with GrossMargin/MVE, and RaisedCapital is not significantly associated with 
GrossMargin/MVE if included in Model 6. 
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inverse Mills ratio as an additional control variable in Models 5 and 6.  Untabulated 
results indicate that inferences gleaned from Tables 5 and 6 are unchanged when the 
inverse Mills ratio is included in the regression models.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines previously unstudied revenue recognition methods (sell-in 
and sell-through revenue recognition for sales to distributors) and finds distinct 
differences in the characteristics of firms that use these methods.  Firms with higher 
growth opportunities and stronger corporate governance are more likely to defer revenue 
recognition (sell-through).  In addition, firms with strong corporate governance are less 
likely to use the sell-in method than firms with weak governance as capital needs and 
management incentives increase.  These results suggest that corporate governance 
proxies should be included in accounting choices models and also interacted with other 
factors expected to be associated with the choices. 
This study also finds evidence suggesting that financial information quality is 
higher under a deferred revenue recognition method.  Specifically, the ability of 
accounting information to predict future cash flows is higher for sell-through firms than 
for sell-in firms.  Accounting information reported under the sell-through method is also 
more timely, meaning that this information is more strongly associated with 
contemporaneous stock returns than accounting information reported under the sell-in 
method.  This evidence may be useful to standard setters currently examining existing 
revenue recognition standards, financial statement users interested in the industries 
studied, and practitioners within high technology industries.   
The findings of this study with respect to financial information quality are 
important because prior research offers mixed evidence regarding financial information 
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quality under different revenue recognition methods (Altamuro et al. 2005; Zhang 2005; 
Forester 2008).  Studies that examine short periods following standard changes 
(Altamuro et al. 2005) and pre-SAB 101 revenue recognition practices (Zhang 2005) 
suggest that more aggressive revenue recognition results in higher financial information 
quality.  However, my findings support recent work that suggests financial information 
quality is higher under methods that defer revenue recognition (Forester 2008).  Thus, 
many settings need to be examined in order to more clearly understand the association 
between revenue recognition practices and financial information quality. 
 47 
REFERENCES 
Aboody, D., M. E. Barth, and R. Kasznik. 2004. Firms' voluntary recognition of stock-
based compensation expense. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (2): 123-150. 
Aboody, D., R. Kasznik, and M. Williams. 2000. Purchase versus pooling in stock-for-
stock acquisitions: Why do firms care? Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 
(3): 261-286. 
Accounting Principles Board (APB). 1972. Opinion No. 22:  Disclosure of Accounting 
Policies. New York, NY: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Ahmed, A. S. 1994. Accounting earnings and future economic rents: An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (3): 377-400. 
Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris. 2002. 
Conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts on dividend policy 
and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77 (4): 867-890. 
Ahmed, A. S., and S. Duellman. 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director 
characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43 
(2-3): 411-437. 
Altamuro, J., A. L. Beatty, and J. Weber. 2005. The effects of accelerated revenue 
recognition on earnings management and earnings informativeness: Evidence 
from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101. The Accounting Review 80 (2): 
373-401. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1997. Statement of 
Position 97-2:  Software Revenue Recognition. New York, NY: AICPA. 
Anderson, K. L., and T. L. Yohn. 2002. The effect of 10-K restatements on firm value, 
information asymmetries, and investors‘ reliance on earnings.  Working paper, 
Georgetown University. 
Armstrong, C. S., A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. 2008. Chief executive officer 
equity incentives and accounting irregularities. Working paper, Stanford 
University. 
Ball, R., S. P. Kothari, and A. Robin. 2000. The effect of international institutional 
factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 29 (1): 1-51. 
Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar. 2008. Earnings quality in initial public offerings. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 45 (2-3): 324-349. 
 48 
Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. S. Yang. 2003. Auditor industry specialization and 
earnings quality. Auditing:  A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 71-97. 
Barth, M. E., W. H. Beaver, and W. R. Landsman. 2001. The relevance of the value 
relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting: Another view. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (1-3): 77-104. 
Barth, M. E., D. P. Cram, and K. K. Nelson. 2001. Accruals and the prediction of future 
cash flows. The Accounting Review 76 (1): 27-58. 
Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1): 3-37. 
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-
465. 
Beasley, M. S., and S. E. Salterio. 2001. The relationship between board characteristics 
and voluntary improvements in audit committee composition and experience. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 18 (4): 539-570. 
Becker, C. L., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of 
audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 
(1): 1-24. 
Beekes, W., P. Pope, and S. Young. 2004. The link between earnings timeliness, 
earnings conservatism and board composition: Evidence from the U.K. 
Corporate Governance:  An International Review 12 (1): 47-59. 
Bergstresser, D., and T. Philippon. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. 
Journal of Financial Economics 80 (3): 511-529. 
Bowen, R. M., A. K. Davis, and S. Rajgopal. 2002. Determinants of revenue-reporting 
practices for internet firms. Contemporary Accounting Research 19 (4): 523-562. 
Bowen, R. M., S. Rajgopal, and M. Venkatachalam. 2008. Accounting discretion, 
corporate governance, and firm performance. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 25 (2): 351-405. 
Burns, N., and S. Kedia. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on 
misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 35-67. 
Caylor, M. 2008. Strategic revenue recognition to avoid negative earnings surprises. 
Working paper, University of South Carolina. 
 49 
Cheng, Q., and T. D. Warfield. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review 80 (2): 441-476. 
Chipalkatti, N., S. Chatterji, and S. Bee. 2007. Effective controls for sales through 
distribution channels. The CPA Journal 77 (9): 60-66. 
Christie, A. A. 1990. Aggregation of test statistics: An evaluation of the evidence on 
contracting and size hypotheses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12 (1): 
15-36. 
Collins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional 
determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 11 (2-3): 143-181. 
Core, J., and W. Guay. 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios 
and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 40 
(3): 613-630. 
Cornett, M. M., A. J. Marcus, and H. Tehranian. 2008. Corporate governance and pay-
for-performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial 
Economics 87 (2): 357-373. 
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). 2004. Component Distribution: Cushioned 
Semiconductor Play. December 21. Zurich, Switzerland. 
Dechow, P. M., and I. D. Dichev. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of 
accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77 (4): 35-59. 
Dechow, P. M., W. Ge, C. R. Larson, and R. G. Sloan. 2007. Predicting material 
accounting manipulations. Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley. 
Dechow, P. M., S. P. Kothari, and R. L. Watts. 1998. The relation between earnings and 
cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25 (2): 133-168. 
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of 
earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by 
the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-36. 
DeFond, M. L., and M. Hung. 2004. Investor protection and corporate governance:  
Evidence from worldwide CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (2): 
269-312. 
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed 
thresholds. The Journal of Business 72 (1): 1-33. 
 50 
Dichev, I. D., and D. J. Skinner. 2002. Large sample evidence on the debt covenant 
hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (4): 1091-1123. 
Ecker, F., J. Francis, I. Kim, P. Olsson, and K. Schipper. 2006. A returns-based 
representation of earnings quality. The Accounting Review 81 (4): 749-780. 
Efendi, J., A. Srivastava, and E. P. Swanson. 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate 
financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal 
of Financial Economics 85 (3): 667-708. 
Erickson, M., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2006. Is there a link between executive 
equity incentives and accounting fraud? Journal of Accounting Research 44 (1): 
113-143. 
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial 
Economics 43 (2): 153-193. 
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
Law and Economics 26 (2): 301-326. 
Feroz, E. H., K. Park, and V. S. Pastena. 1991. The financial and market effects of the 
SEC's accounting and auditing enforcement releases. Journal of Accounting 
Research 29 (3): 107-142. 
Fields, T. D., T. Z. Lys, and L. Vincent. 2001. Empirical research on accounting choice. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (1-3): 255-307. 
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC). 2006. Results of the 
Annual Survey on the Priorities of the FASB (October 2006). 
http://www.fasb.org/fasac/ 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1978. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1:  Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises. Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
———. 1980. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2:  Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information. Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
———. 1981. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 48:  Revenue 
Recognition When Right of Return Exists. Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
———. 2008. Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting:  The Objective of 
Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and Constraints of 
Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information.  Exposure Draft. Norwalk, 
CT: FASB. 
 51 
Forester, C. 2008. Does more conservative revenue recognition improve the 
informativeness of earnings? Working paper, University of Minnesota. 
Francis, J., P. Olsson, and K. Schipper. 2006. Earnings quality. Foundations and Trends 
in Accounting 1 (4): 259-340. 
Garcia Lara, J. M., B. Garcia Osma, and F. Penalva. 2009. Accounting conservatism and 
corporate governance. Review of Accounting Studies 14 (1): 161-201. 
Glass, Lewis & Co. 2004. Revenue Recognition Policies, Practices and Disclosures - 
Pharmaceutical Industry.  http://www.glasslewis.com 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. Financial restatements: Update of 
public company trends, market impacts, and regulatory enforcement activities. In 
Report 06-678. Washington, D C: Government Printing Office. 
Greenberg, H. 2006. A shift to ‗sell-in‘ accounting could be clue to brewing trouble. The 
Wall Street Journal, June 17. 
Greene, W. 2003. Econometric Analysis. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Heckman, J. J. 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47 (1): 
153-161. 
Hosmer, D. W., and S. Lemeshow. 2000. Applied Logistic Regression. 2nd ed. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hribar, P., and D. C. Nichols. 2007. The use of unsigned earnings quality measures in 
tests of earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research 45 (5): 1017-
1053. 
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and failure of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance 48 (3): 831–880. 
Kellog, R. L. 1984. Accounting activities, security prices, and class action lawsuits. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 6 (3): 185-204. 
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 375-400. 
KMPG LLP. 2006. Improved point-of-sale reporting benefits manufacturers, channels, 
and end users.  A study of the high tech industry.    
http://www.kpmg.ca/en/industries/ice/pointofsale.html 
Larcker, D. F., and S. A. Richardson. 2004. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and 
corporate governance. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 625-658. 
 52 
Lee, H. L., V. Padmanabhan, T. A. Taylor, and S. Whang. 2000. Price protection in the 
personal computer industry. Management Science 46 (4): 467-482. 
Lee, K. W., B. Lev, and G. H. H. Yeo. 2008. Executive pay dispersion, corporate 
governance, and firm performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting 30 (3): 315-338. 
Levine, C. B., and J. S. Hughes. 2005. Management compensation and earnings-based 
covenants as signaling devices in credit markets. Journal of Corporate Finance 
11 (5): 832-850. 
Levitt, A. 1998. The numbers game. In speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and 
Business. New York, NY.  
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt 
Lindenberg, E., and S. Ross. 1981. Tobin‘s q and industrial organization. Journal of 
Business 54 (1): 1-32. 
Lipton, M., and J. Lorsch. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. 
Business Lawyer 48 (1): 59-77. 
Marquardt, C. A., and C. I. Wiedman. 2004. How are earnings managed? An 
examination of specific accruals. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (2): 
459-491. 
Matsunaga, S. R., and C. W. Park. 2001. The effect of missing a quarterly earnings 
benchmark on the CEO's annual bonus. The Accounting Review 76 (3): 313-332. 
Mayhew, B. W., and M. S. Wilkins. 2003. Audit firm industry specialization as a 
differentiation strategy: Evidence from fees charged to firms going public. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 33-52. 
Owhoso, E. V., W. F. Messier, and J. G. Lynch. 2002. Error detection by industry 
specialized teams during sequential audit review. Journal of Accounting 
Research 40 (3): 883-900. 
Palmrose, Z.-V., and S. Scholz. 2004. The circumstances and legal consequences of non-
GAAP reporting: Evidence from restatements. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 21 (1): 139-180. 
Penman, S. H., and X.-J. Zhang. 2002. Accounting conservatism, the quality of earnings, 
and stock returns. The Accounting Review 77 (2): 237-264. 
Rogers, W. H. 1993. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Technical 
Bulletin (13): 19-23. 
 53 
Roychowdhury, S., and R. L. Watts. 2007. Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-
to-book and conservatism in financial reporting. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 44 (1): 2-31. 
Schipper, K., and L. Vincent. 2003. Earnings quality. Accounting Horizons 17 
(Supplement): 97-110. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 1999. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101:  
Revenue Recognition. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
———. 2003. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104:  Revenue Recognition. Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal 
of Political Economy 94 (3): 461-488. 
Skinner, D. J. 1993. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (4): 407-445. 
Srivastava, A. 2008. The challenges of improving revenue-recognition standard for 
multiple-element firms: Evidence from the software industry (SOP 97-2). 
Working paper, Northwestern University. 
St. Pierre, K., and J. A. Anderson. 1984. An analysis of the factors associated with 
lawsuits against public accountants. The Accounting Review 59 (2): 242-263. 
Stubben, S. R. 2006. The use of discretionary revenues to meet earnings and revenue 
targets. Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University. 
Sweeney, A. P. 1994. Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (3): 281-308. 
Turner, L. 2001. Revenue recognition. In speech delivered at the USC SEC and 
Financial Reporting Institute. Los Angeles, CA.  
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch495.htm 
Watts, R. L. 2003. Conservatism in accounting part 1:  Explanations and implications. 
Accounting Horizons 17 (3): 207-221. 
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Wooldridge, J. M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
  
 54 
Wu, M. 2003. Earnings restatements: A capital market perspective. Working paper, 
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. 
Zhang, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and 
borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 (1): 27-54. 
Zhang, Y. 2005. Revenue recognition timing and attributes of reported revenue: The 
case of software industry's adoption of SOP 91-1. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 39 (3): 535-561. 
  
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
EXCERPTS FROM SELECT 10-K REVENUE RECOGNITION DISCLOSURES 
 56 
Skyworks Solutions 2005 10-K:  Sell-in 
Certain product sales are made to electronic component distributors under agreements 
allowing for price protection and/or a right of return on unsold products. A reserve for 
sales returns and allowances for customers is recorded based on historical 
experience or specific identification of an event necessitating a reserve. 
 
Silicon Laboratories 2005 10-K:  Sell-through 
Certain of the Company‘s sales are made to distributors under agreements allowing 
certain rights of return and price protection on products unsold by distributors. 
Accordingly, the Company defers revenue and gross profit on such sales until the 
distributors sell the product to the end customer. 
 
Netgear 2005 10-K:  Sell-in 
In addition to warranty-related returns, certain distributors and retailers generally have 
the right to return product for stock rotation purposes. Every quarter, stock rotation 
rights are limited to 10% of invoiced sales to the distributor or retailer in the prior 
quarter. Upon shipment of the product, the Company reduces revenue for an 
estimate of potential future product warranty and stock rotation returns related to 
the current period product revenue. Management analyzes historical returns, channel 
inventory levels, current economic trends and changes in customer demand for the 
Company‘s products when evaluating the adequacy of the allowance for sales returns, 
namely warranty and stock rotation returns. 
 57 
 
Advanced Micro Devices (2004):  Sell-through 
The Company sells to distributors under terms allowing the distributors certain rights of 
return and price protection on unsold merchandise held by them. The distributor 
agreements, which may be canceled by either party upon specified notice, generally 
contain a provision for the return of the Company‘s products in the event the agreement 
with the distributor is terminated and the distributor‘s products have not been sold. 
Accordingly, the Company defers the gross margin resulting from the deferral of 
both revenue and related product costs from sales to distributors with agreements 
that have the aforementioned terms until the merchandise is resold by the 
distributors. The Company also sells its products to distributors with substantial 
independent operations under sales arrangements whose terms do not allow for  
rights of return or price protection on unsold products held by them. In these instances, 
the Company recognizes revenue when it ships the product directly to the 
distributors. 
 
**Bold emphasis indicates the information that led to classification as sell-in or sell-
through. 
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TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Sell-In = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm's annual 10-K indicates in 
the Notes to Financial Statements that it uses the sell-in revenue 
recognition method for sales to distributors; and otherwise 0. 
  
Variables Included in Revenue Recognition Choice Model  
Age = the number of years since the firm was first listed in CRSP. 
Bonus = the CEO‘s annual bonus compensation scaled by the CEO‘s annual 
salary [ExecuComp], averaged over years t-2 through t. 
Comp = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm‘s primary industry is 
computers (SIC 3570-3579, 3680-3689, and 3695), and otherwise 0. 
EquityIncent = Onepct/(Onepct + Salary + Bonus) averaged over years t-2 through t. 
Onepct equals the change in value of all granted stock options and 
common stock owned by the CEO for a one percent change in stock 
price.  See Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Core and Guay 
(2002) [ExecuComp data]. 
Gov = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is classified as having 
strong corporate governance and otherwise 0.  Four measures are used 
to determine corporate governance strength:  board size, board 
independence, institutional ownership, and use of an industry specialist 
auditor.  Board size and board independence data are obtained from 
RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC).  Institutional ownership data are obtained 
from Thomson Financial.  Each firm-year observation is compared to 
the annual sample median for each of these three measures.  A value of 
1 is assigned to each measure if it indicates strong monitoring:  above 
median board independence and institutional ownership or below 
median board size, otherwise a value of 0 is assigned.  Compustat data 
is used to determine if the auditor is an industry specialist based on 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) definition of a differentiated auditor.  
Auditors considered a specialist are given a value of 1 for the specialist 
measure and a value of 0 otherwise.  The sum of the four governance 
measures is totaled, and it ranges from 0 to 4.  Firm-year governance 
sums are then compared to the annual median governance sum.  Gov 
equals 1 for values above the median, else Gov equals 0. 
IntCover = interest expense [Compustat Annual # 15] divided by operating 
income before depreciation [Compustat Annual # 13].  This ratio is 
capped at 2.0.  All observations with negative operating income before 
depreciation are assigned a value of 2.0 for this ratio. 
Lev = long-term debt [Compustat Annual # 9], scaled by total assets at the 
end of the fiscal year [Compustat Annual # 6]. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
  
LnAsset = natural log of the fiscal year-end total assets [Compustat Annual #6]. 
MTB = the fiscal-year end market value of equity [Compustat Annual # 25 * 
# 199] scaled by the fiscal-year end book value of equity [Compustat 
Annual # 60+# 74]. 
R&D = research and development expense [Compustat Annual # 46], scaled 
by total assets at the end of the fiscal year [Compustat Annual # 6]. 
Raised Capital = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm issued new debt and equity 
[Compustat Annual # 108 + # 111] greater than 20 percent of average 
annual assets during the current fiscal year, and otherwise 0. 
Retvol = the standard deviation of daily stock returns over prior fiscal-year 
(minimum of 100 daily observations for each firm-year to calculate the 
daily stock return) [CRSP].  Due to the narrow distribution of this 
variable (0.01 – 0.09), I multiply the value by 10 prior to running Model 
1 so that it more closely represents an indicator variable. 
ROA = net income [Compustat # 172], scaled by average total assets. 
  
Variables Included in Accounting Information and Cash Flow Model 
ΔGrossMargin = change in quarterly gross margin from the same quarter of the 
preceding fiscal year [Compustat Quarterly # 2 - # 30], scaled by 
quarter-end total assets [Compustat Quarterly # 44].  
ΔOCF = change in quarterly cash flows from operations from the same quarter 
of the preceding fiscal year [Compustat Quarterly # 108] scaled by 
quarter-end total assets [Compustat Quarterly # 44]. 
ΔOtherExp = change in other expenses from the same quarter of the preceding 
fiscal year [Compustat Quarterly # 2 - # 30 - #69], scaled by quarter-
end total assets [Compustat Quarterly # 44]. 
  
Variables Included in Accounting Information and Stock Return Model 
Adj_Ret = cumulative stock returns beginning two days after the prior quarter‘s 
earnings announcement and ending one day after the current quarter‘s 
earnings announcement, adjusted by the value weighted market index 
[CRSP].  
Beta = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the Beta is greater than the sample 
median for the quarter, and otherwise 0.  Beta equals the systematic risk 
from the market model for the twelve month period ending before the 
start of the current quarter [CRSP]. 
MTB = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the market-to-book ratio is greater 
than the sample median for the quarter, and otherwise 0.  Market-to-
book ratio equals Compustat Quarterly (#14×#61)/(#59 + #52). 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
  
GrossMargin/ 
MVE 
= quarterly gross margin [Compustat Quarterly # 2 - # 30], scaled by 
market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter [Compustat 
Quarterly # 14× # 61]. 
Neg = an indicator variable equal to 1 if Adj_Ret is less than 0, and 
otherwise 0. 
Persist = an indicator variable equal to 1 if gross margin persistence is greater 
than the sample median for the quarter, and otherwise 0.  Gross margin 
persistence equals σ in the following seasonal ARIMA model: 
(GrossMargint – GrossMargint-4) = σ(GrossMargint-1 – GrossMargint-5) 
+ εt – θεt-4. 
Size = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm‘s natural log of assets at the 
beginning of the quarter (Compustat Quarterly # 44) is greater than the 
sample median for the quarter, and otherwise 0. 
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Compustat firm-years during 2001-2005
Within Computer and Electronics Industries
  Base sample 4,515        
Missing Compustat data (1,470)       
Missing ExecuComp data (2,341)       
Missing RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) data (141)          
Missing CRSP data (1)              
Missing Sell-in classification (83)            
  Final sample
  Firm years 479           
  Unique firms 119           
TABLE 2
Sample Selection
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Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample, Sell-In Firms, and Sell-Through Firms
Mean
25% 
Quartile Median
75% 
Quartile Mean
25% 
Quartile Median
75% 
Quartile Mean
25% 
Quartile Median
75% 
Quartile
Age 
a,b
20 8 14 28 22 8 15 32 15 9 13 20
Assets 3,932 349 1,109 2,572 4,213 317 1,004 2,704 3,377 482 1,470 2,408
Bonus 0.31 0.16 0.31 0.47 0.31 0.17 0.31 0.47 0.32 0.16 0.30 0.48
EquityIncent 
a,b
0.33 0.13 0.26 0.48 0.29 0.12 0.20 0.37 0.42 0.22 0.39 0.57
Gov 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
IntCover 
b
0.41 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.38 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.23
Lev 
a,b
0.10 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.14
MTB 
a,b
2.87 1.61 2.28 3.45 2.64 1.58 2.14 3.10 3.34 1.75 2.84 4.37
R&D 
a,b
0.09 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.14
RaisedCapital 
a,b
0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Retvol 
a,b
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
ROA -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.09
Sell-In 0.66 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Full Sample N = 479 Sell-In Firms N = 318 Sell-Through Firms N = 161
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables Included in the Revenue Recognition Choice Model
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Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics by Industry
Mean
25% 
Quartile Median
75% 
Quartile Mean
25% 
Quartile Median
75% 
Quartile
Age 18 8 14 21 20 9 15 29
Assets 
a,b
6,003 547 1,609 4,855 3,255 337 941 2,404
Bonus 0.33 0.20 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.16 0.29 0.47
EquityIncent 
a,b
0.28 0.12 0.18 0.33 0.35 0.14 0.30 0.50
Gov 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00
IntCover 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.23
Lev 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.19
MTB 2.72 1.56 2.14 3.20 2.92 1.62 2.36 3.58
R&D 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.12
RaisedCapital 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Retvol 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
ROA -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.08
Sell-In 
a,b
0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00
TABLE 3 (continued)
Computer Firms N = 118 Electronic Firms N = 361
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Panel C:  Correlations Based on the Full Sample of Firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Sell-In 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.30 -0.36 -0.18 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.14 0.11 0.17
2 Lev 0.11 0.59 0.20 0.08 -0.16 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 0.32 -0.25 0.02 0.30 0.03
3 IntCover -0.05 0.15 0.13 -0.17 -0.11 0.09 -0.35 -0.06 0.06 -0.61 0.22 0.06 0.06
4 RaisedCapital 0.08 0.21 0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.03
5 Bonus -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.08 -0.20 -0.20 0.24 0.01 0.40 0.39 -0.19 0.25 0.06
6 EquityIncet -0.25 -0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.20 0.23 0.33 -0.12 0.24 0.03 0.19 -0.19 -0.12
7 R&D -0.35 -0.08 0.30 -0.05 -0.22 0.17 0.06 -0.09 -0.22 -0.20 0.33 -0.20 -0.06
8 MTB -0.17 -0.07 -0.22 0.04 0.24 0.29 0.13 -0.03 0.19 0.50 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06
9 Gov -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.14 -0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.14 0.00 -0.12 0.06
10 LnAsset -0.01 0.22 -0.19 -0.09 0.44 0.17 -0.23 0.12 -0.16 0.11 -0.24 0.38 0.11
11 ROA 0.06 -0.14 -0.60 -0.05 0.26 0.00 -0.27 0.28 0.17 0.07 -0.47 0.07 -0.06
12 Retvol -0.13 0.06 0.35 0.04 -0.15 0.18 0.33 0.04 -0.01 -0.22 -0.49 -0.29 -0.04
13 Age 0.20 0.20 -0.19 0.05 0.33 -0.20 -0.25 -0.07 -0.11 0.51 0.14 -0.32 -0.06
14 Comp 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07
TABLE 3 (continued)
All variables are defined in Table 1 with the following exception.  Assets is the total fiscal-year end assets (millions of dollars).  All variables are winsorized at the top 
and bottom one percent except for IntCover and indicator variables.  IntCover is capped at 2.0, and the ratio is set to 2.0 for all observations with negative operating 
income before depreciation.  In Panel A, mean (median) differences between sell-in and sell-through firms at p < 0.10 using a two-tailed t (Wilcoxon Sum-Rank) test are 
denoted by 
a (b)
.  In Panel B, mean (median) differences between computers and electronics firms at p < 0.10 using a two-tailed t (Wilcoxon) test are denoted by 
a (b)
.  In 
Panel C, the upper (lower) diagonal of contains Spearman (Pearson) correlations.  Bolded correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Variable Prediction Coeff. Z-Stat Prediction Coeff. Z-Stat
Capital Requirement Proxies
Lev ? 1.763 (1.15) ? 2.027 (1.22)
Lev ×Gov - -0.517 (-0.21)
IntCover ? 0.146 (0.53) ? 0.195 (0.62)
IntCover ×Gov - 0.106 (0.22)
RaisedCapital ? 0.335 (0.73) ? 1.305 (1.82) *
RaisedCapital ×Gov - -1.929 (-1.81) **
Management Incentive Proxies
Bonus ? -1.422 (-1.15) ? -0.185 (-0.13)
Bonus ×Gov - -3.709 (-1.99) **
EquityIncent ? -1.544 (-1.50) ? -0.308 (-0.31)
EquityIncent ×Gov - -5.082 (-2.50) ***
Growth Opportunities Proxies
R&D ? -1.945 (-3.83) *** ? -1.971 (-3.74) ***
R&D ×Gov - -0.576 (-0.68)
MTB ? -0.011 (-0.12) ? 0.003 (0.03) **
MTB ×Gov - 0.030 (0.16)
Governance
Gov - -0.804 (-2.35) *** - 2.581 (2.29)
Other Controls
LnAsset ? -0.293 (-1.29) -0.347 (-1.53)
ROA ? 0.972 (0.89) 1.333 (1.07)
Retvol ? 5.978 (0.63) ? 10.573 (1.02)
Age ? 0.037 (2.19) ** ? 0.039 (2.29) **
Comp ? 1.251 (2.13) ** ? 1.247 (2.20) **
Chi-square Tests Chi-Sq
Lev + Lev ×Gov ? 1.510 (0.40)
IntCover + IntCover ×Gov ? 0.301 (0.42)
RaisedCapital + RaisedCapital ×Gov ? -0.624 (0.67)
Bonus + Bonus ×Gov ? -3.893 (4.91) **
EquityIncent + EquityIncent ×Gov ? -5.390 (6.84) ***
R&D + R&D ×Gov - -2.547 (8.17) ***
MTB + MTB ×Gov - 0.033 (0.03)
TABLE 4
Coefficients and Z-Statistics from a Logistic Regression Comparing Firm Characteristics and 
Use of the Sell-in and Sell-through Revenue Recognition Methods
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable = Sell-In
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N 479 479
Pseudo R
2
0.22 0.26
% Correctly Classified 73% 75%
Area under ROC curve 80% 82%
Model 1 Model 2
See Table 1 for definitions of all variables.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, 
for a one-tailed test when a prediction is made and a two-tailed test when no prediction is made.  All z-statistics are calculated using 
Rogers standard errors clustered by firm.  
TABLE 4 (continued)
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Variable Coeff. t-Stat
Intercept -0.060 (-3.01) ***
Sell-In 0.040 (3.19) ***
Δ GrossMargin 0.643 (9.13) ***
Δ OtherExp -0.088 (-2.76) ***
Sell-In× Δ GrossMargin -0.267 (-2.98) ***
Sell-In× Δ OtherExp 0.030 (0.69)
Firm and time fixed effects Yes
N 1,899
Adjusted R
2
0.12
See Table 1 for definitions of all variables.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
top and bottom one percent.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.  
TABLE 5
Coefficients and t-Statistics for a Firm and  Quarterly Fixed-
Effects Regression of the Asssociation between 
One-Quarter Ahead Seasonal Changes in Operating Cash 
Flow, Current Period Seasonal Changes in Gross Margin and 
Other Expenses, and Sell-In 
Dependent variable = Δ OCF i,t+1
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Variable Coeff. t-Stat
Intercept 0.038 (4.34) ***
AdjRet 0.066 (7.89) ***
Sell-In 0.003 (0.57)
Neg -0.001 (-0.37)
Beta -0.002 (-1.49)
MTB -0.014 (-8.41) ***
Size 0.004 (1.23)
Persist -0.003 (-2.03) **
AdjRet×Sell-In -0.012 (-2.14) **
AdjRet×Neg -0.006 (-0.64)
AdjRet×Beta -0.003 (-0.61)
AdjRet×MTB -0.027 (-5.30) ***
AdjRet×Size 0.005 (0.93)
AdjRet×Persist -0.015 (-2.92) ***
Firm and time fixed effects Yes
N 1,688
Adjusted R
2
0.74
TABLE 6
Coefficients and t-Statistics from Regressions of the 
Association between Gross Margin, Market-
Adjusted Quarterly Stock Returns, Sell-In , and 
Control Variables 
See Table 1 for definitions of all variables.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom one percent.  *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, for 
two-tailed tests.  
Dependent variable = 
GrossMargin t /MVE t-1
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